Abstract. Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) is a fundamental primitive used in many distributed cryptographic tasks, such as Multiparty Computation (MPC) and Byzantine Agreement (BA). It is a two phase (sharing, reconstruction) protocol. The VSS and MPC protocols are carried out among n parties, where t out of n parties can be under the influence of a Byzantine (active) adversary, having unbounded computing power. It is well known that protocols for perfectly secure VSS and perfectly secure MPC exist in an asynchronous network iff n ≥ 4t + 1. Hence, we call any perfectly secure VSS (MPC) protocol designed over an asynchronous network with n = 4t + 1 as optimally resilient VSS (MPC) protocol. A secret is d-shared among the parties if there exists a random degreed polynomial whose constant term is the secret and each honest party possesses a distinct point on the degree-d polynomial. Typically VSS is used as a primary tool to generate t-sharing of secret(s). In this paper, we present an optimally resilient, perfectly secure Asynchronous VSS (AVSS) protocol that can generate d-sharing of secret for any d, where t ≤ d ≤ 2t. This is the first optimally resilient, perfectly secure AVSS of its kind in the literature. Specifically, our AVSS can generate d-sharing of ℓ ≥ 1 secrets from F concurrently, with a communication cost of O(ℓn 2 log |F|) bits, where F is a finite field. Communication complexity wise, the best known optimally resilient, perfectly secure AVSS is reported in [2] . The protocol of [2] can generate t-sharing of ℓ secrets concurrently, with the same communication complexity as our AVSS. However, the AVSS of [2] and [4] (the only known optimally resilient perfectly secure AVSS, other than [2]) does not generate d-sharing, for any d > t. Interpreting in a different way, we may also say that our AVSS shares ℓ(d+1−t) secrets simultaneously with a communication cost of O(ℓn 2 log |F|) bits. Putting d = 2t (the maximum value of d), we notice that the amortized cost of sharing a single secret using our AVSS is only O(n log |F|) bits. This is a clear improvement over the AVSS of [2] whose amortized cost of sharing a single secret is O(n 2 log |F|) bits.
Introduction
VSS or MPC protocol is carried out among a set of n parties, say P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, where every two parties are directly connected by a secure channel and t parties can be under the influence of a computationally unbounded Byzantine (active) adversary A t . The adversary A t completely dictates the parties under its control and can force them to deviate from a protocol, in any arbitrary manner.
VSS: Any VSS scheme consists of two phases: (i) a sharing phase in which a special party in P, called dealer (denoted as D), on having a secret s ∈ F (an element from a finite field F), shares it among all the parties; (ii) a reconstruction phase, in which the parties reconstruct the secret from their shares. Informally, the goal of any VSS scheme is to allow D to share his secret s during the sharing phase, among the parties in P in such a way that the shares would later allow for a unique reconstruction of s in the reconstruction phase. Moreover, if D is honest, then the secrecy of s from A t should be preserved until the reconstruction phase. VSS is one of the fundamental building blocks for many secure distributed computing tasks, such as MPC, Byzantine Agreement (BA), etc. VSS has been studied extensively over the past three decades in different settings and computational models (see [15, 5, 24, 14, 13, 18, 19] and their references).
MPC: MPC [26, 10, 5, 24] allows the parties in P to securely compute an agreed function f , even in the presence of A t . More specifically, assume that the agreed function f can be expressed as f : F n → F n and party P i has input x i ∈ F, where F is a finite field and |F| ≥ n. At the end of the computation of f , each honest P i gets y i ∈ F, where (y 1 , . . . , y n ) = f (x 1 , . . . , x n ), irrespective of the behavior of A t (Correctness). Moreover, A t should not get any information about the input and output of the honest parties, other than what can be inferred from the input and output of the corrupted parties (Secrecy). In any general MPC protocol, the function f is specified by an arithmetic circuit over F, consisting of input, linear (e.g. addition), multiplication, random and output gates. We denote the number of gates of these types in the circuit by c I , c A , c M , c R and c O respectively. [3, 2, 1, 11, 17, 22] .
Among all the different type of gates, evaluation of a multiplication gate requires the most communication complexity. So the communication complexity of any general MPC is usually given in terms of the communication complexity per multiplication gate
The VSS and MPC problem has been studied extensively over synchronous network, which assumes that there is a global clock and the delay of any message in the network channel is bounded. However, VSS and MPC in asynchronous network has got comparatively less attention, due to its inherent hardness. As asynchronous networks model the real life networks like Internet more appropriately than synchronous networks, the fundamental problems like VSS and MPC are worthy of deep investigation over asynchronous networks.
Definitions
Asynchronous Networks: In an asynchronous network, the communication channels have arbitrary, yet finite delay (i.e the messages are guaranteed to reach eventually). To model this, A t is given the power to schedule delivery of all messages in the network. However, A t can only schedule the messages communicated between honest parties, without having any access to them. Here the inherent difficulty in designing a protocol comes from the fact that when a party does not receive an expected message then he cannot decide whether the sender is corrupted (and did not send the message at all) or the message is just delayed. So a party can not wait to consider the values sent by all parties, as waiting for them could turn out to be endless. Hence the values of up to t (potentially honest) parties may have to be ignored. Due to this the protocols in asynchronous network are generally involved in nature and require new set of primitives. For comprehensive introduction to asynchronous protocols, see [8] .
Asynchronous Verifiable Secret Sharing (AVSS) [4, 8] : Let (Sh, Rec) be a pair of protocols in which a dealer D ∈ P shares a secret s from a finite field F using Sh. We say that (Sh, Rec) is a t-resilient perfectly secure AVSS scheme with n parties if the following hold for every possible A t :
• Termination: (1) If D is honest then each honest party will eventually terminate protocol Sh. (2) If some honest party has terminated protocol Sh, then irrespective of the behavior of D, each honest party will eventually terminate Sh. (3) If all the honest parties have terminated Sh and all the honest parties invoke protocol Rec, then each honest party will eventually terminate Rec.
• Correctness: (1) If D is honest then each honest party upon completing protocol Rec, outputs the shared secret s. (2) If D is faulty and some honest party has terminated Sh, then there exists a fixed s ∈ F, such that each honest party upon completing Rec, will output s.
• Secrecy: If D is honest and no honest party has begun Rec, then A t has no information about s. The above definition of AVSS can be extended for secret S containing multiple elements (say ℓ with ℓ > 1) from F.
Asynchronous Multi Party Computation (AMPC) [8] : A perfectly secure AMPC should satisfy the Correctness and Secrecy property of MPC. In addition, it should also satisfy Termination property, according to which, every honest party should eventually terminate the protocol.
d-sharing and (t, 2t)-sharing [1, 3] : A value s ∈ F is d-shared among a set of parties P ⊆ P with |P| ≥ d + 1 if there exists a degree-d polynomial f (x) with f (0) = s such that each honest P i ∈ P holds s i = f (i). The vector of shares of s belonging to the honest parties is called d-sharing of s and is denoted by [s] d . A value s is said to be (t, 2t)-shared among the parties in P, denoted as [s] (t,2t) , if s is simultaneously t-shared, as well as 2t-shared among the parties in P.
A-cast [9, 8] : It is an asynchronous broadcast primitive, which allows a special party in P (called the sender) to distribute a message identically among the parties in P. If sender is honest, then every honest party eventually terminates A-cast with the sender's message. For a corrupted sender, if some honest party terminates with some message, then every other honest party will eventually terminate with same message. A-cast is elegantly implemented in [7] with n = 3t+1, which incurs a private communication of O(n 2 b) bits, for a b-bit message.
Agreement on Common Subset (ACS) [2, 6] : It is an asynchronous primitive presented in [4, 6] . It is used to determine and output a common set, containing at least n−t parties, who correctly shared their values. Each honest party will eventually get a share, corresponding to each value, shared by the parties in the common set. ACS requires private communication of O(poly(n) log |F|) bits.
Our Contributions and Comparison with Existing Results
Our Contribution: From [4, 8] , perfectly secure AVSS and AMPC is possible iff n ≥ 4t + 1. Hence, we call any perfectly secure AVSS (AMPC) protocol with n = 4t + 1 as optimally resilient, perfectly secure AVSS (AMPC) protocol. Typically, AVSS is used as a tool for generating t-sharing of secrets. In this paper, we present a novel optimally resilient, perfectly secure AVSS protocol that can generate d-sharing of ℓ secrets concurrently for any d, where t ≤ d ≤ 2t, with a private communication of O(ℓn 2 log(|F|)) bits and A-cast of O(n 2 log(|F|)) bits. Interpreting in a different way, we may also say that the amortized cost of sharing a single secret using our AVSS is only O(n log |F|) bits (this will be discussed in detail after the presentation of AVSS protocol in section 4).
To design our AVSS, we exploit several interesting properties of (n, t)-star (a graph theoretic concept presented in section 4.4.2 of [8] ) in conjunction with some properties of bivariate polynomial with different degree in variable x and y. The (n, t)-star was used to design a perfectly secure optimally resilient AVSS protocol in [8] (the details of (n, t)-star is presented in Section 2 of current article). While the properties of (n, t)-star that our AVSS explores were not required in the AVSS of [8] (which generates only t-sharing of secrets), our AVSS uses them for the first time for generating d-sharing of secrets, where t ≤ d ≤ 2t.
As an interesting application of our AVSS, we design a new optimally resilient, perfectly secure AMPC protocol that communicates O(n 2 log |F|) bits per multiplication gate. This solves an open problem posed in [22] . Using our AVSS, we first design an efficient protocol that generates (t, 2t)-sharing of a secret with a communication cost of O(n 2 log |F|) bits. Then following the approach of [11, 2] , given (t, 2t)-sharing of a secret, a multiplication gate is evaluated by communicating O(n 2 log |F|) bits. This is how our AMPC attains quadratic communication complexity per multiplication gate.
Comparison of Our AVSS with Existing AVSS Protocols: In Table 1 , we compare our AVSS with existing optimally resilient, perfectly secure AVSS protocols. We emphasize that the AVSS protocols of [4, 2] does not generate d-sharing for any d > t. When negligible error probability is allowed in Termination and/or Correctness, we arrive at the notion of statistical AVSS. Statistical AVSS is possible iff n ≥ 3t + 1 [9, 6] . To the best of our knowledge, the AVSS protocols of [9, 6, 21, 20] are the only known optimally resilient statistical AVSS (i.e., with n = 3t+1). As these protocols have comparatively high communication complexity and are designed with n = 3t + 1 (with which perfectly secure AVSS is impossible), we do not compare our AVSS with the statistical AVSS protocols of [9, 6, 21, 20] . Recently in [22] , a statistical AVSS with n = 4t+1 (i.e., with nonoptimal resilience) is reported. Clearly, our AVSS achieves stronger properties than the AVSS of [22] (the AVSS of [22] involves a negligible error probability, while our AVSS is perfect), though both of them generate d-sharing for any t ≤ d ≤ 2t, with same communication complexity. For achieving perfectness, we use techniques which are completely different from [22] .
Reference # Secrets Shared Type of Sharing Generated Communication Complexity
In Bits (CCIB) [4] 1 Only t-sharing Table 2 , we compare our AMPC protocol with the existing optimally resilient, perfectly secure AMPC protocols in terms of communication complexity. We observe that our AMPC gains by a factor of Ω(n) as compared to the best known perfectly secure AMPC of [2] . If negligible error probability is allowed in Termination and/or Correctness, we arrive at the notion of statistical AMPC. Statistical AMPC is possible iff n ≥ 3t + 1 [6] . Optimally resilient statistical AMPC protocols (i.e., with n = 3t + 1) are reported in [6, 20] . As these protocols have very high communication complexity and are designed with n = 3t + 1 (with which perfectly secure AMPC is impossible), we do not compare them with our AMPC protocol. Statistical AMPC with n = 4t + 1 (i.e., with non-optimal resilience) are reported in [25, 23, 22] . Among them, the AMPC reported in [22] is the best, which communicates O(n 2 log(|F|)) bits per multiplication gate. Though the protocol of [22] attains the same communication complexity as our AMPC protocol (per multiplication gate), our protocol is perfect in all respects, while the protocol of [22] has error probability in both Termination and Correctness. [16, 17] . The best known AMPC under cryptographic assumptions is due to [17] , which communicates O(n 2 κ) bits per multiplication gate, where κ is the security parameter. Our AMPC protocol attains the same communication complexity as the AMPC of [17] in stronger security model (i.e information theoretic security).
Finding (n, t)-star Structure in a Graph
We now describe an existing solution for a graph theoretic problem, called finding (n, t)-star in an undirected graph G = (V, E). Our AVSS protocol exploits several interesting properties of (n, t)-star.
Definition 1 ((n, t)-star [8, 4] :). Let G be an undirected graph with the n parties in P as its vertex set. We say that a pair (C, D) of sets with
Ben-Or et. al [4] have presented an elegant and efficient algorithm for finding an (n, t)-star in a graph of n nodes, provided that the graph contains a clique of size n − t. The algorithm, called Find-STAR outputs either an (n, t)-star or the message star-Not-Found. Whenever the input graph contains a clique of size n − t, Find-STAR always outputs an (n, t)-star in the graph. Actually, algorithm Find-STAR takes the complementary graph G of G as input and tries to find (n, t)-star in G where (n, t)-star is a pair (C, D) of sets with C ⊆ D ⊆ P, satisfying the following conditions: (i) |C| ≥ n − 2t; (ii) |D| ≥ n − t; (iii) there are no edges between the nodes in C and nodes in C ∪ D in G. Clearly, a pair (C, D) representing an (n, t)-star in G, is an (n, t)-star in G. Recasting the task of Find-STAR in terms of complementary graph G, we say that Find-STAR outputs either a (n, t)-star, or a message star-Not-Found. Whenever, the input graph G contains an independent set of size n − t, Find-STAR always outputs an (n, t)-star. For simple notation, we denote G by H. The algorithm Find-STAR is presented in the following table and its properties in APPENDIX STAR.
Algorithm Find-STAR(H)
1. Find a maximum matching M in H. Let N be the set of matched nodes (namely, the endpoints of the edges in M ), and let N = P \ N . 2. Compute output as follows (which could be either (n, t)-star or a message star-Not-Found):
output star-Not-Found.
AVSS for Generating d-sharing of a Single Secret
We now present a novel AVSS protocol consisting of two sub-protocols, namely AVSS-Share-SS and AVSS-Rec-SS. The AVSS-Share-SS allows a dealer D ∈ P (dealer can be any party from P) to d-share a single secret from F, among the parties in P, where t ≤ d ≤ 2t. Protocol AVSS-Rec-SS allows the parties in P to reconstruct the secret, given its d-sharing. The structure of AVSS-Share-SS is divided into a sequence of following three phases. An honest party will terminate AVSS-Share-SS, if it successfully completes the last phase, namely Generation of d-sharing Phase. If D is honest then each honest party will eventually terminate the last phase. Moreover, if D is corrupted and some honest party terminates the last phase, then each honest party will also eventually terminate the last phase (and hence AVSS-Share-SS).
Remark 1.
The sharing phase of statistical AVSS protocol of [22] is also structured into above three phases. However, our implementation of Verification & Agreement on CORE Phase is completely different from [22] . More importantly, the last two phases in [22] involves a negligible error probability, whereas our implementation of all the three phases are perfect (error free) in all respects.
Distribution Phase
Here D on having a secret s, selects a random bivariate polynomial F (x, y) of degree-(d, t) (i.e., the degree of the polynomial in x is d and the degree of the polynomial in y is t), such that F (0, 0) = s and sends f i (x) = F (x, i) and p i (y) = F (i, y) to party P i . As in [22] , we will call the degree-d f i (x) polynomials as row polynomials and degree-t p i (y) polynomials as column polynomials.
) and pi(y) = F (i, y) to party Pi, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Verification & Agreement on CORE Phase
The goal of this phase is to check the existence of a set of parties called CORE. If a CORE exists then every honest party will agree on CORE, where CORE is defined as follows Definition 2 (Property of CORE:). CORE is a set of at least 3t + 1 parties such that the row polynomials (received in Distribution Phase) of the honest parties in CORE define a unique bivariate polynomial say,
The property of CORE ensures that for every j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the j th point on row polynomials of honest parties in CORE define degree-t column polynomial p j (y) = F (j, y). So once CORE is constructed and agreed upon by each honest party then p j (0) can be privately reconstructed by P j with the help of the parties in CORE by using online error correction (OEC) [8] 1 . This will generate d-sharing of s = F (0, 0), where s will be d-shared using degree-d polynomial f 0 (x) = F (x, 0) and each (honest) P j will have his share f 0 (j) = p j (0) of s. Moreover, if D is honest, then s = s as F (x, y) = F (x, y). Note that even though the degree of row polynomials is more than t (if d > t), we create a situation where parties need not have to reconstruct them. To obtain the shares corresponding to d-sharing of s, the parties need to reconstruct degree-t column polynomials only. We now give an outline of this phase.
Outline of Current Phase: Here the parties upon receiving row and column polynomials (from D), interact with each other to check the consistency of their common values (on their polynomials). After successfully verifying the consistency, parties A-cast OK signals. Using these signals, a graph with the parties as vertex set is formed and applying Find-STAR on the graph, a sequence of distinct (n, t)-stars are obtained. The reason for constructing a sequence of (n, t)-stars will be clear in the sequel. Each (n, t)-star in such a graph defines a unique bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t).
For every generated (n, t)-star, D tries to find whether CORE can be generated from it. The generation process of CORE attempts to use several interesting features of (n, t)-star (mainly its C component). We show that if D is honest and C component of some (n, t)-star (C, D) contains at least 2t + 1 honest parties, then CORE will be eventually generated from (C, D). Moreover, we also show that if D is honest, then eventually some (n, t)-star (C, D) will be generated, where C will contain at least 2t + 1 honest parties (though the dealer D may not know which (n, t)-star it is). These two important properties of (n, t)-star in our context are the heart our AVSS protocol. Furthermore, we show that if CORE is generated from some (n, t)-star (C, D) (irrespective of whether D is honest or corrupted), then both CORE, as well as (C, D) define the same bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t).
The generation of many (n, t)-stars in our case is essential as the C component of the first (n, t)-star may not contain at least 2t + 1 honest parties and hence may never lead to CORE. This implies that if our protocol stops after generating the first (n, t)-star then the protocol may not terminate even for an honest D. However, we stress that existing AVSS of [4] need not generate a sequence of (n, t)-stars because it has to generate only t-sharing. Hence the AVSS of [4] stops after generating the first (n, t)-star and then using the D component of the generated (n, t)-star, it could generate t-sharing of s. Finally, once CORE is obtained, it is then verified and agreed among the set of all honest parties in P. The steps of this phase are given in protocol Verification-SS.
the row polynomials held by honest parties in C define a unique polynomial of degree-(d, t), say
F (x, y), such that column polynomial p j (y) held by every honest P j ∈ D satisfies p j (y) = F (j, y). Moreover, if D is honest, then F (x, y) = F (x, y).
Proof: For any (n, t)-star (C, D), |C| ≥ n − 2t and |D| ≥ n − t. So C and D contain at least n − 3t ≥ t + 1 and n − 2t ≥ 2t + 1 honest parties, respectively. Let l and m be the number of honest parties in C and D respectively where l ≥ t + 1 and m ≥ 2t + 1. For convenience, we assume P 1 , . . . , P l , respectively P 1 , . . . , P m are the set of honest parties in C and D. Now by the construction of (n, t)-star, for every pair of honest parties (P i , P j ) with P i ∈ C and P j ∈ D, the row polynomial f i (x) of honest P i and the column polynomial p j (y) of honest P j satisfy f i (j) = p j (i). We now prove that the above statement implies that there exists a unique bivariate polynomial F (x, y) of degree-(d, t), such that for i = 1, . . . , l, we have F (x, i) = f i (x) and for j = 1, . . . , m, we have F (j, y) = p j (y).
Protocol Verification-SS(D, P, s, d)
i. Code for Pi: Every party Pi ∈ P (including D) executes this code.
1. Wait to receive polynomials fi(x) of degree-d and pi(y) of degree-t from D. Upon receiving, send fij = fi(j) and pij = pi(j) to party Pj, for j = 1, . . . , n.
2. Upon receiving fji and pji from Pj , check if fi(j)
= pji and pi(j) ? = fji. If both the equalities hold, A-cast OK(Pi, Pj ). 3. Construct an undirected graph Gi with P as vertex set. Add an edge (Pj , P k ) in
Gi upon receiving (a) OK(P k , Pj) from the A-cast of P k and (b) OK(Pj , P k ) from the A-cast of Pj .
ii. 
If no (n, t)-star is found or an (n, t)-star that has been already found in the past is obtained, then execute step (a).iv(A-B) to update existing F γ 's and E γ 's. (c) Now let β be the first index among already generated {(E 1 , F 1 ), . . . , (E δ , F δ )} such that both E β and F β contains at least 3t + 1 parties (Note that if step (a) is executed, then δ = α + 1; else δ = α). Assign CORE = E β and A-cast
iii. Code for Pi: Every party Pi ∈ P (including D) executes this code.
Wait to receive ((C
β , D β ), (E β , F β )) from the A-cast of D. 2. Wait until (C β , D β ) becomes a valid (n, t)-star in Gi.
Wait until every party Pj ∈ F
β has at least 2t + 1 neighbors in C α in Gi. 4. Wait until every party Pj ∈ E β has at least d + t + 1 neighbors in F α in Gi.
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 4.26 of [8] . Let
T . Now consider the polynomials f 1 (x), . . . , f t+1 (x) and let E be the (t + 1) × (d + 1) matrix, where E ij is the coefficient of x j in f i (x), for i = 1, . . . , t + 1 and j = 0, . . . , d. So for i = 1, . . . , t + 1 and j = 1, . . . , d + 1, the (i, j)
T . Now we define a bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t), say F (x, y) where F (x, y) = i=d i=0 j=t j=0 r ij x i y j . Then from the properties of bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t), for i = 1, . . . , t + 1 and j = 1, . . . , d + 1, we have
This implies that for i = 1, . . . , t+1, the polynomials F (x, i) and f i (x) have same value at d + 1 values of x. But since degree of F (x, i) and
Next, we will show that for any t + 1 < i ≤ l, the polynomial f i (x) also lies on F (x, y). In other words, F (x, i) = f i (x), for t + 1 < i ≤ l. This is easy to show because according to theorem statement, f i (j) = p j (i), for j = 1, . . . , d + 1 and p 1 (i), . . . , p d+1 (i) lie on F (x, i) and uniquely defines F (x, i). Since both f i (x) and F (x, i) are of degree d, this implies that
It is very easy to see because if D is honest, then
with C β containing at least 2t + 1 honest parties will be generated eventually.
Proof: For an honest D, eventually the edges between each pair of honest parties will vanish from the complementary graph G D . So the edges in G D will be either (a) between an honest and a corrupted party OR (b) between a corrupted and another corrupted party. Let β be the first index, such that (n, t)-
is generated in G D , when G D contains edges of above two types only. Now, by construction of C β (see Algorithm Find-STAR), it excludes the parties in N (set of parties that are endpoints of the edges of maximum matching M ) and T (set of parties that are triangle-head). An honest P i belonging to N implies that (P i , P j ) ∈ M for some P j and hence P j is corrupted (as the current G D does not have edge between two honest parties). Similarly, an honest party P i belonging to T implies that there is some (P j , P k ) ∈ M such that (P i , P j ) and (P j , P k ) are edges in G D . This clearly implies that both P j and P k are surely corrupted. So for every honest P i outside C β , at least one (if P i belongs to N , then one; if P i belongs to T , then two) corrupted party also remains outside C β . As there are at most t corrupted parties, C β may exclude at most t honest parties. But still C β is bound to contain at least 2t + 1 honest parties. We now show that the above event happens after finite number of steps. We prove this by showing that an honest D may compute O(n 2 ) distinct (n, t)-stars in G D . This is because D applies Find-STAR on G D every time after an edge is added to G D and there can be O(n 2 ) edges in G D . Now (C β , D β ) with C β containing at least 2t + 1 parties will be one among these O(n 2 ) (n, t)-stars. 2
Lemma 3. In protocol Verification-SS, if D is honest, then eventually CORE will be generated.
Proof: By Lemma 2, the honest D will eventually generate an (C β , D β ) in G D , with C β containing at least 2t + 1 honest parties. Furthermore, if D is honest then eventually there will be edges between every pair of honest parties in the graph G i of every honest P i (including G D ). Thus, as all honest parties in P will have edges with the honest parties in C β , they will be eventually added to F β . Similarly, as all honest parties in P will have edges with the honest parties in F β , they will be eventually added to E β . Hence |E β | ≥ n − t and |F β | ≥ n − t will be satisfied and CORE will be obtained by D.
2
Lemma 4. If an honest P i has accepted CORE, then the row polynomials of the honest parties in CORE define a unique bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t).
Proof: If an honest P i has accepted CORE, then he has received ((C β , D β ), (E β , F β )) from the A-cast of D and checked their validity with respect to his own graph G i . By Lemma 1, the row polynomials of the honest parties in C β define a unique bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t), say F (x, y). So the row polynomial held by an honest P i ∈ C satisfies f i (x) = F (x, i). Now by the construction of F β , every honest P j ∈ F β has at least 2t + 1 neighbors in C β which implies that f kj values received from at least 2t + 1 parties in C β lie on column polynomial p j (y). This clearly implies p j (y) = F (j, y), as t + 1 out of these 2t + 1 values are sent by honest parties in C, who define F (j, y).
Similarly, by construction of E β , every honest P j ∈ E β has at least d + t + 1 neighbors in F β which implies that p kj values received from at least d + t + 1 parties in F β lie on f j (x). This implies that f j (x) = F (x, j), as at least d + 1 out of these d + t + 1 values are sent by honest parties in F β , who define F (x, j). Hence row polynomials of the honest parties in CORE define F (x, y). 
Generation of d-sharing Phase
Assuming that the honest parties in P have agreed upon a CORE, protocol d-Share-Generation-SS generates d-sharing in the following way: From the properties of CORE, the row polynomials of honest parties in CORE define a unique bivariate polynomial say F (x, y) of degree-(d, t), such that each honest party P i in CORE possesses f i (x) = F (x, i). So the j th point on f i (x) polynomials corresponding to all honest P i 's in CORE, define degree-t polynomial p j (y) = F (j, y). Furthermore, |CORE| ≥ 3t + 1. So the parties in CORE can enable each P j ∈ P to privately reconstruct p j (y) using OEC [8] . Once this is done, every P j can output p j (0) as the share of D's committed secret. Since
Lemma 5. Assume that every honest party has agreed on CORE where the row polynomials of the honest parties in CORE define a unique bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t), say F (x, y). Then protocol d-Share-Generation-SS will generate d-sharing of s = F (0, 0).
Proof: To achieve d-sharing of s using polynomial f 0 (x), party P i should hold f 0 (i) as i th share of s. Now f 0 (i) = p i (0) holds by the property of bivariate polynomial. Also by property of CORE, the i th point on f j (x) polynomials, corresponding to honest P j 's in CORE define degree-t polynomial p j (y). So P i can apply OEC on f ji 's received from the parties in CORE (during Protocol Verification-SS), reconstruct p j (y) and obtain p j (0) which is i th share of s. 2
Protocol d-Share-Generation-SS(D, P, s, d)
Code for Pi:
1. Apply On-line Error Correcting (OEC) technique [8] on fji's received from every Pj in CORE (during Protocol Verification-SS) and reconstruct degree-t polynomial pi(y) and output si = pi(0) = f0(i) as the i th share of s and terminate. s is now d-shared using polynomial f0(x). Protocol AVSS-Rec-SS(D, P, s, d)
Protocol
Party Pi ∈ P sends si, the i th share of s to every Pj ∈ P. Party Pi applies OEC on received sj 's, reconstructs s and terminates AVSS-Rec-SS. 
. By the property of A-cast (and as graph G i is constructed on the basis of A-casted information) every honest party will receive, verify the validity of D's A-casted information with respect to his own graph G i and agree on the CORE. Now the proof for this part follows from Lemma 5.
Part (2) of Termination says that if an honest party terminated AVSSShare-SS, then every other honest party will terminate AVSS-Share-SS eventually. An honest P i has terminated the protocol implies that he has agreed on CORE. This means that P i has received and verified the validity of D's A-casted information with respect to his own graph G i . The same will happen eventually for all other honest parties. Hence they will agree on CORE. Now the proof follows from Lemma 5.
Part (3) of Termination follows from the correctness of OEC.
Correctness: If the honest parties terminate AVSS-Share-SS, then it implies that s(= F (0, 0)) is properly d-shared among the parties in P (by Lemma 5), where F (x, y) is the unique bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t) defined by the honest parties in CORE. Moreover if D is honest then F (x, y) = F (x, y) (follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 4) and hence s = s. Now the Correctness follows from the correctness of OEC.
Secrecy: Let A t controls P 1 , . . . , P t . So A t will know f 1 (x), . . . , f t (x) and p 1 (y), . . . , p t (y). Throughout the protocol, the parties exchange common values (on row and column polynomials), which do not add any extra information to the view of A t . Now by the property of bivariate polynomial of degree-(d, t), d − t + 1 coefficients of f 0 (x) = F (x, 0) will remain secure, where F (x, y) is the polynomial used by D to hide his secret s. So s = f 0 (0) = F (0, 0) will remain secure. 2
Theorem 2. AVSS-Share-SS privately communicates O(n 2 log |F|) bits and Acasts O(n 2 log |F|) bits. Protocol AVSS-Rec-SS privately communicates O(n 2 log |F|).
Proof: In Distribution-SS, D privately communicates O(n 2 log |F|) bits. In Verification-SS, the parties privately communicate O(n 2 log |F|) bits. In addition, the parties also A-cast OK(., .)s, which requires A-cast communication of O(n 2 log |F|)
In d-Share-Generation-SS, no communication is performed. So in total, AVSS-Share-SS requires private communication of O(n 2 log |F|) bits and A-cast of O(n 2 log |F|) bits. In AVSS-Rec-SS, the parties in P send their shares to every party in P. So AVSS-Rec-SS requires O(n 2 log |F|) bits of private communication. 
AVSS for Generating d-sharing of Multiple Secrets
We now present an AVSS protocol consisting of two sub-protocols, namely AVSS-Share-MS and AVSS-Rec-MS: AVSS-Share-MS allows a dealer D ∈ P to d-share ℓ ≥ 1 secret(s) from F, denoted as S = (s 1 , . . . , s ℓ ), among the parties in P, with t ≤ d ≤ 2t; AVSS-Rec-MS allows the parties to reconstruct the secrets, given their d-sharing. Notice that we can generate d-sharing of S by concurrently executing protocol AVSS-Share-SS (given in the previous section) ℓ times, once for each s i ∈ S. But this will require a private communication of O(ℓn 2 log(F)) and A-cast of O(ℓn 2 log(F)) bits. However, our protocol AVSS-Share-MS requires a private communication of O(ℓn 2 log |F|) and A-cast of O(n 2 log |F|) bits. Thus, the A-cast communication of our AVSS-Share-MS protocol is independent of ℓ. The idea behind protocol AVSS-Share-MS is same as AVSS-Share-SS. Protocol AVSS-Share-MS is divided into a sequence of same three phases, as in AVSS-Share-SS. We now present the corresponding protocols.
Code for D:
Input Phase
In protocol InputPhase, each party acts as a dealer and t-share his input(s) by executing an instance of AVSS-Share-MS. The parties then execute ACS to agree on a common set C of n − t parties, whose instances of AVSS-Share-MS have terminated. As the input(s) of the parties in C will be considered for computation (of the circuit), each party considers the t-sharing of all the inputs shared by parties, only in C. As the protocol is very straight forward, we present it in APPENDIX B.
Lemma 7. Each honest party terminates InputPhase. The protocol generates tsharing of the inputs of the parties in C, such that A t has no information about the inputs of the honest parties in C, by privately communicating O(c I n 2 log |F|) bits, A-casting O(n 3 log |F|) bits and executing one ACS.
Computation Phase
Once the input phase is over, in the computation phase, the circuit is evaluated gate by gate, where all inputs and intermediate values are t-shared among the parties. As soon as a party holds his shares of the input values of a gate, he joins the computation of the gate. Due to the linearity of the used t-sharing, linear gates can be computed locally simply by applying the linear function to the shares. With every random gate, one random (t, 2t)-sharing (from the preparation phase) is associated, whose t-sharing is directly used as outcome of the random gate. With every multiplication gate, one random (t, 2t)-sharing (from the preparation phase) is associated, which is then used to compute tsharing of the product, following the technique of [11] : Let z = xy, where x, y are the inputs of the multiplication gate, where x, y are t-shared, i. [11, 2] . The same approach is also used in the computation phase of AMPC protocol of [2, 22] . We present the protocol in APPENDIX B and state the following lemma: 
Conclusion and Open Problems
We proposed a generic, perfectly secure, optimally resilient AVSS protocol, that generates d-sharing of secrets with t ≤ d ≤ 2t. In order to design our AVSS, we exploit: (i) several interesting properties of (n, t)-star that are explored for the first time; (ii) some properties of bivariate polynomial with different degree in x and y. Using our AVSS as a building block, we designed a perfectly secure optimally resilient AMPC protocol that communicates O(n 2 log |F|) bits per multiplication gate, improving the best known perfectly secure optimally resilient AMPC protocol of [2] by a factor of Ω(n). It would be interesting to further reduce the communication complexity of AMPC protocol with 4t + 1.
Proof: Clearly, if Find-STAR outputs (C, D) then |C| ≥ n − 2t and |D| ≥ n − t, and C ⊆ D. We now show that for every P i ∈ C and every P j ∈ D, the nodes P i and P j are not neighbours in H.
On the contrary, assume that P i ∈ C and P j ∈ D, such that (P i , P j ) is an edge in H. As P j ∈ D, we must have P j ∈ B. By the definition of B, we have P j ∈ N (if P i ∈ C and P j ∈ N , then P j ∈ B). Furthermore, P i ∈ C ⊆ N . Thus, both P i and P j are unmatched. Consequently, the edge (P i , P j ) can be added to the maximum matching to create a larger matching, which is a contradiction.2
Lemma 10 ([8])
. Let H be a graph with P as its vertex set, containing an independent set of size n − t. Then algorithm Find-STAR always outputs a (n, t)-star, say (C, D), in H.
Proof: We show that if H contains an independent set of size n − t, then Find-STAR can always find |C| and |D| to be large enough (i.e |C ≥ n − 2t| and |D| ≥ n − t) to output a (n, t)-star (C, D).
We first show that |C| ≥ n − 2t. Let I ⊆ P be an independent set in H, and let I = P \ I. Since the size of I is n − t, we have |I| ≤ t. Let F = I \ C. We show that |F | ≤ |I|. Consequently, we have |C| ≥ |I| − |F | ≥ n − 2t. To prove that |F | ≤ |I|, we show a one-to-one correspondence φ : F → I. Let P i ∈ F . Since P i ∈ C, we have either P i ∈ N or P i ∈ T .
Case I: P i ∈ N . Then let φ(P i ) be the node matched to P i in M . Clearly, φ(P i ) ∈ I: otherwise, we had an edge (P i , φ(P i )) where both P i and φ(P i ) are in an independent set. Case II: P i ∈ T . By the definition of T , node P i has two neighbours, P j and P k , such that (P j , P k ) ∈ M . Arbitrarily set φ(P i ) = P j . Clearly, both P j and P k are in I.
